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Abstract 
 
This article surveys some of the main design principles, mechanisms, circuits, and 
architectures that have been discovered during a half century of systematic research aimed at 
developing a unified theory that links mind and brain, and shows how psychological 
functions arise as emergent properties of brain mechanisms. The article describes a 
theoretical method that has enabled such a theory to be developed in stages by carrying out a 
kind of conceptual evolution. It also describes revolutionary computational paradigms like 
Complementary Computing and Laminar Computing that constrain the kind of unified theory 
that can describe the autonomous adaptive intelligence that emerges from advanced brains. 
Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, is one of the core models that has been discovered in 
this way. ART proposes how advanced brains learn to attend, recognize, and predict objects 
and events in a changing world that is filled with unexpected events. ART is not, however, a 
“theory of everything” if only because, due to Complementary Computing, different 
matching and learning laws tend to support perception and cognition on the one hand, and 
spatial representation and action on the other. The article mentions why a theory of this kind 
may be useful in the design of autonomous adaptive agents in engineering and technology. It 
also notes how the theory has led to new mechanistic insights about mental disorders such as 
autism, medial temporal amnesia, Alzheimer’s disease, and schizophrenia, along with 
mechanistically informed proposals about how their symptoms may be ameliorated.  
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Towards a unified theory of mind and brain 
A major scientific and technological revolution in understanding autonomous adaptive 
intelligence is currently underway. How the brain works provides a critical example of such 
intelligence. This revolution has been supported, in part, by publications over the past 50 
years of design principles, mechanisms, circuits, and architectures that are part of an 
emerging unified theory of biological intelligence. This emerging theory explains and 
predicts how brain mechanisms give rise to mental functions as emergent properties.  
 This theory has clarified how advanced brains are designed to enable individuals to 
autonomously adapt in real time in response to complex changing environments that are 
filled with unexpected events. Its results hereby provide a blueprint for designing 
increasingly autonomous adaptive agents for future applications in engineering and 
technology. Many large-scale applications in engineering and technology have already been 
developed; e.g., http://techlab.bu.edu/resources/articles/C5.  
 As part of the development of the biological theory, the data from thousands of 
psychological and neurobiological experiments have been explained and predicted in a 
unified way, including data about perception, cognition, cognitive-emotional dynamics, and 
action. These results include an emerging unified theory of what happens in an individual 
brain when it consciously sees, hears, feels, or knows something; how seeing, hearing, 
feeling, and knowing can be integrated into unified moments of conscious experience; and 
how unconscious processes can influence a brain’s decision-making (Grossberg, 2017b). 
 As sufficiently mature models of typical, or normal, behaviors became understood, it 
also became possible to increasingly explain brain mechanisms and behavioral symptoms of 
mental disorders. Applications to autism, schizophrenia, and medial temporal amnesia were 
among the first to be made; e.g., Carpenter and Grossberg (1993), Grossberg (2000b), and 
Grossberg and Seidman (2006). Additional applications have been recently made towards 
explaining how the dynamics of learning, memory, and cognition may break down during 
Alzheimer’s disease, why slow wave sleep disorders are often correlated with Alzheimer’s 
disease and other mental disorders, and how symptoms of Fragile X syndrome and autistic 
repetitive behaviors may arise (Grossberg, 2017a; Grossberg and Kishnan, 2017), and how 
these insights may help to guide new clinical therapies. 
 How did a theory that was developed to explain data about the learning and 
performance of typical, or normal, behaviors lead to explanations of data about mental 
disorders? This happened when it began to be noticed that, when various model brain 
mechanisms become imbalanced in prescribed ways, then formal analogs of behavioral 
symptoms of different mental disorders emerged. In autism, these imbalances include 
underaroused emotional depression in the drive representations of regions like the amygdala, 
hypervigilant learning and narrowing of attention in the recognition learning circuits of brain 
regions like the temporal and prefrontal cortices, and a failure of adaptively-timed learning in 
brain regions like the hippocampus, basal ganglia, and cerebellum (Grossberg and Seidman, 
2006). In this way, one could begin to understand the neural mechanisms and behavioral 
symptoms of mental disorders on a continuum with neural mechanisms and behavioral 
properties of typical behaviors.  
 Said in another way, after one does due diligence in discovering and characterizing 
the brain mechanisms of normal behaviors, then mechanistic explanations of clinical data 
automatically emerge from these theories. In a similar way, the discovery of key brain 
mechanisms, circuits, and architectures to explain one kind of data has often thrust me into 
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explanations of other, seemingly quite different, kinds of data where variations and 
specialization of these mechanisms, circuits, and architectures are also operative. In this 
sense, by getting the theoretical foundations of biological intelligence right, one can then 
begin to reap the benefits of the gift that never stops giving.  
 
 
Figure 1. A modeling method and cycle that clarifies how increasingly refined neural models 
can explain and predict increasingly large interdisciplinary behavioral and neurobiological 
data bases.  
 
A theoretical method for linking brain to mind: The method of minimal anatomies 
One cannot hope to derive a unified theory of an entire brain in one step, and one should not 
try to do so. Rather, this grand goal can be achieved incrementally, in stages, starting with a 
large behavioral database that excites a theorist’s imagination (Figure 1). The derivation 
begins with behavioral data because brain evolution needs to achieve behavioral success, 
Starting with behavioral data enables models to be derived whose brain mechanisms have 
been shaped during evolution by behavioral success. Starting with a large database helps to 
rule out incorrect, but otherwise seemingly plausible, models of how a brain works. 
 Such a derivation has always led in the past to the discovery of novel design principles 
and mechanisms (Figure 1) with which to explain how an individual, behaving in real time, 
can generate the behavioral data as emergent properties. This conceptual leap from data to 
design is the art of modeling. Once derived, despite being based on psychological constraints, 
the minimal mathematical model that realizes the behavioral design principles has always 
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looked like part of a brain (Figure 1). I first experienced such a derivation of brain 
mechanisms from psychological hypotheses when I was a Freshman at Dartmouth College in 
1957-1958. It was a transformative experience that shaped the rest of my life 
https://youtu.be/9n5AnvFur7I. 
 The past 60 years of modeling have abundantly supported the hypothesis that brains 
look the way that they do because they embody natural computational designs whereby 
individuals autonomously adapt to changing environments in real time. The revolution in 
understanding biological intelligence is thus, more specifically, a revolution in understanding 
autonomous adaptive intelligence. The link from behavior-to-principle-to-model-to-brain has, 
in addition, often disclosed unexpected functional roles of the derived brain mechanisms that 
are not clear from neural data alone. 
 At any stage of this modeling cycle, the goal is to first derive the minimal model that 
embodies the psychological hypotheses that drive the model derivation. Such a “minimal” 
model is one for which, if any model mechanism is removed, or “lesioned”, then the 
remaining model can no longer explain a key set of previously explained data. A wise 
theorist should, I believe, strongly resist “throwing in” known neural mechanisms that are not 
yet in the minimal model if there is no functional understanding of why they are needed. 
Once the link between mechanism and function is broken in this way, the ability of the 
current minimal model to drive further model refinements will be lost. 
 In particular, once a connection is made top-down from behavior to brain by such a 
minimal model, mathematical and computational analysis discloses what data the minimal 
model, and its individual and species variations, can and cannot explain. The data that cannot 
be explained are as important as those that can be explained, because they demarcate a 
“boundary between the known and the unknown”. Analysis of this boundary focuses a 
theorist’s attention upon design principles that the current model does not yet embody. These 
new design principles and their mechanistic realizations are then consistently incorporated 
into the model to generate a more realistic model, and one that has always been able to 
explain and predict a lot more psychological and neurobiological data. If the model cannot be 
refined, or unlumped, in this way, then that is strong evidence that the current model contains 
a serious error, and must be discarded. 
 This theoretical cycle has been successfully repeated multiple times, and has led to 
models with an increasingly broad explanatory and predictive range, including models that 
can individually explain psychological, neurophysiological, neuroanatomical, biophysical, 
and biochemical data.  In this specific sense, the classical Mind/Body problem is being 
solved through principled, albeit incremental, refinements and expansions of theoretical 
understanding. One can think of these incremental refinements as a way that a theory can try 
to carry out a kind of “conceptual evolution” by analyzing how various environmental 
pressures may have driven the biological evolution of our brains. 
 
Revolutionary brain paradigms: Complementary Computing and Laminar Computing 
The possibility of deriving a unified theory of mind and brain has built upon the discovery 
that advanced brains embody novel computational paradigms in order to achieve autonomous 
adaptive intelligence. Two of these paradigms are Complementary Computing and Laminar 
Computing.  
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Figure 2.  Complementary Computing clarifies why there are multiple parallel processing 
streams in the brain, each with multiple processing stages to resolve computational 
uncertainties that cannot be overcome by just one processing stream or stage. The anatomical 
macrocircuit of the visual system dramatically illustrates this state of affairs. 
 
Complementary Computing (Grossberg, 2000a) describes how the brain is organized into 
complementary parallel processing streams whose interactions generate biologically 
intelligent behaviors (Figure 2). A single cortical processing stream can individually compute 
some properties well, but cannot, by itself, process other computationally complementary 
properties. Pairs of complementary cortical processing streams interact to generate emergent 
properties that overcome their complementary deficiencies to compute complete information 
with which to represent or control some faculty of intelligent behavior.  Complementary 
Computing hereby clarifies how different brain regions can achieve a great deal of 
specialization without being independent modules.   
 Figure 2 includes an anatomical macrocircuit of the monkey visual system that 
illustrates its multiple brain regions, and the dense connections between them (Felleman and 
van Essen, 1991). Figure 3 summarizes a macrocircuit of some of the main brain regions that 
are modeled in an emerging unified theory of visual intelligence, and the perceptual 
processes that they carry out. This macrocircuit also includes bottom-up, horizontal, and top-
down connections that are needed to overcome computational weaknesses due to 
Complementary Computing that each brain region would experience if it acted alone. 
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Figure 3.  A model macrocircuit of an emerging unified theory of visual intelligence. Its 
processing stages begin at the retina and end in the prefrontal cortex, and include both the 
What and the Where cortical processing streams. The bottom-up, horizontal, and top-down 
interactions between model processing stages are needed to overcome the computational 
weaknesses that each processing stage would experience if it acted alone, due to 
Complementary Computing. 
 
The WHAT and WHERE cortical streams are complementary 
The category learning, attention, recognition, and prediction circuits of the ventral, or What, 
cortical processing stream for perception and cognition (Mishkin, 1982; Mishkin, 
Ungerleider, and Macko, 1983) are computationally complementary to those of the dorsal, or 
Where and How, cortical processing steam for spatial representation and action (Goodale and 
Milner, 1992; Mishkin, 1982; Mishkin, Ungerleider, and Macko, 1983).  One reason for this 
What-Where complementarity is that the What stream learns object recognition categories 
that are substantially invariant under changes in an object's view, size, and position. These 
invariant object categories enable our brains to recognize valued objects without 
experiencing a combinatorial explosion. They cannot, however, locate and act upon a desired 
object in space. Cortical Where stream spatial and motor representations can locate objects 
and trigger actions towards them, but cannot recognize them. By interacting together, the 
What and Where streams can recognize valued objects and direct appropriate goal-oriented 
actions towards them.  
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Adaptive Resonance Theory 
Abundant psychological and neurobiological data have confirmed all of the foundational 
predictions concerning how perceptual/cognitive processes in the What stream use excitatory 
matching and match-based learning to create self-stabilizing categorical representations of 
objects and events, notably recognition categories that can be learned quickly without 
experiencing catastrophic forgetting during subsequent learning. In other words, this learning 
process solves the stability-plasticity dilemma. They thereby enable increasing expertise, and 
an ever-expanding sense of self, to emerge throughout life. See Grossberg (2013, 2017b) for 
reviews. 
 
 
Figure 4. ART Matching Rule. Bottom-up inputs can activate their target featural cells, other 
things being equal.  A top-down expectation, by itself, can only modulate, prime, or sensitize 
cells in its excitatory on-center (green pathways with hemicircular adaptive synapses) 
because of the wider off-surround (red pathways) that tends to balance the top-down 
excitation (“one-against-one”) within the on-center, while causing driving inhibition in the 
off-surround. When bottom-up inputs and a top-down expectation are both active, only cells 
where bottom-up excitation and the top-down excitatory prime converge in the on-center can 
fire (“two-against-one”), while other featural cells are inhibited. 
 
Excitatory matching by object attention is embodied by the ART Matching Rule (Figure 4). 
This type of attentional circuit enables us to prime our expectations to anticipate objects and 
events before they occur, and to focus attention upon expected objects and events when they 
do occur. Good enough matches between expected and actual events trigger resonant states 
that can support learning of new recognition categories and refinement of old ones, while 
also triggering conscious recognition of the critical feature patterns that are attended and 
enable recognition to occur. Excitatory matching also controls reset of the attentional focus 
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when bottom-up inputs significantly mismatch currently active top-down expectations. 
Cycles of resonance and reset underlie much of the brain's perceptual and cognitive dynamics 
(Figure 5).  
 These matching and learning laws have been articulated as part of Adaptive 
Resonance Theory, or ART, which has been systematically developed since it was first 
reported in 1976 (Grossberg, 1976a, 1976b). ART is a cognitive and neural theory of how the 
brain autonomously learns to attend, recognize, and predict objects and events in a changing 
world. ART is currently the most highly developed cognitive and neural theory available, 
with the broadest explanatory and predictive range. Central to ART's predictive power is its 
ability to carry out fast, incremental, and stable unsupervised and supervised learning in 
response to a changing world. ART specifies mechanistic links between processes of 
Consciousness, Learning, Expectation, Attention, Resonance, and Synchrony (the CLEARS 
processes) during both unsupervised and supervised learning. I have predicted that all brains 
that can solve the stability-plasticity dilemma do so using these predicted links between 
CLEARS processes. Indeed, my 41-year old prediction that "all conscious states are resonant 
states" is consistent with all the data that I know, and has helped to explain many data about 
consciousness, as will be briefly noted below. 
 ART hereby contributes to functional and mechanistic explanations of such diverse 
topics as 3D vision and figure-ground perception in natural scenes; optic-flow based 
navigation in natural scenes towards goals around obstacles and spatial navigation in the 
dark; invariant object and scenic gist learning, recognition, and search; prototype, surface, 
and boundary attention; gamma and beta oscillations during cognitive dynamics; learning of 
entorhinal grid cells and hippocampal place cells, including the use of homologous spatial 
and temporal mechanisms in the medial entorhinal-hippocampal system for spatial navigation 
and the lateral stream for adaptively timed cognitive-emotional learning; breakdowns in 
attentive vigilance during autism, medial temporal amnesia, and Alzheimer's disease; social 
cognitive abilities such as the learning of joint attention and the use of tools from a teacher, 
despite the different coordinate systems of the teacher and learner; a unified circuit design for 
all item-order-rank working memories that enable stable learning of recognition categories, 
plans, and expectations for the representation and control of sequences of linguistic, spatial, 
and motor information; conscious speech percepts that are influenced by future context; 
auditory streaming in noise during source segregation; and speaker normalization that 
enables language learning from adults after a critical period of babbled sounds by a child; 
cognitive-emotional dynamics that direct motivated attention towards valued goals; and 
adaptive sensory-motor control circuits, such as those that coordinate predictive smooth 
pursuit and saccadic eye movements, and coordinate looking and reaching movements. Brain 
regions that are functionally described include visual and auditory neocortex; specific and 
nonspecific thalamic nuclei; inferotemporal, parietal, prefrontal, entorhinal, hippocampal, 
parahippocampal, perirhinal, and motor cortices; frontal eye fields; supplementary eye fields; 
amygdala; basal ganglia: cerebellum; and superior colliculus.  
 ART does not, however, describe many spatial and motor behaviors. These processes 
typically use different matching and learning laws. ART is thus not "a theory of everything". 
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Figure 5. How ART searches for and learns a new recognition category using cycles of 
match-induced resonance and mismatch-induced reset. (a) Input pattern I is instated across 
feature detectors at level F1 as an activity pattern X, at the same time that it generates 
excitatory signals to the orienting system A with a gain ρ  that is called the vigilance 
parameter. Activity pattern X generates inhibitory signals to the orienting system A as it 
generates a bottom-up input pattern S to the category level F2. A dynamic balance within A 
between excitatory inputs from I and inhibitory inputs from S keeps S quiet. The bottom-up 
signals in S are multiplied by learned adaptive weights to form the input pattern T to F2. The 
inputs T are contrast-enhanced and normalized within F2  by recurrent lateral inhibitory 
signals that obey the membrane equations of neurophysiology, otherwise called shunting 
interactions. This competition leads to selection and activation of a small number of cells 
within F2  that receive the largest inputs. The chosen cells represent the category Y that codes 
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for the feature pattern at F1. In this figure, a winner-take-all category is shown. (b) The 
category activity Y generates top-down signals U that are multiplied by adaptive weights to 
form a prototype, or critical feature pattern, V that encodes the expectation that the active F2 
category has learned for what feature pattern to expect at F1. This top-down expectation input 
V is added at F1 cells. If V mismatches I at F1, then a new STM activity pattern X* (the 
hatched pattern), is selected at cells where the patterns match well enough. In other words, 
X* is active at I features that are confirmed by V. Mismatched features (white area) are 
inhibited. When X changes to X*, total inhibition decreases from F1 to A. (c) If inhibition 
decreases sufficiently, A releases a nonspecific arousal burst to F2; that is, “novel events are 
arousing”. The vigilance parameter ρ  determines how bad a match will be tolerated before a 
burst of nonspecific arousal is triggered. This arousal burst triggers a memory search for a 
better-matching category, as follows: Arousal resets F2 by inhibiting Y. (d) After Y is 
inhibited, X is reinstated and Y stays inhibited as X activates a different category, that is 
represented by a different activity pattern Y*, at  F2.. Search continues until a better matching, 
or novel, category is selected. When search ends, an attentive resonance triggers learning of 
the attended data in adaptive weights within both the bottom-up and top-down pathways. As 
learning stabilizes, inputs I can activate their globally best-matching categories directly 
through the adaptive filter, without activating the orienting system. [Adapted with permission 
from Carpenter and Grossberg (1993).] 
 
Vector Associative Maps for spatial representation and action 
Complementary spatial/motor processes in the Where stream often use inhibitory matching 
and mismatch-based learning to continually update spatial maps and sensory-motor gains that 
can effectively control our changing bodies throughout life. Inhibitory matching can take 
place between representations of where we want to move and where we are now (Figure 6), 
so that when we arrive at where we want to be, the match equals zero. Inhibitory matching by 
the Vector Associative Map, or VAM, Matching Rule thus cannot solve the stability-
plasticity dilemma (Gaudiano and Grossberg, 1991, 1992). That is why spatial and motor 
representations cannot support conscious qualia. Instead, spatial maps and motor gains 
experience catastrophic forgetting as they learn how to accurately control our changing 
bodies throughout life.  
Together these complementary processes create a self-stabilizing perceptual/cognitive 
front end in the What stream for learning about the world and becoming conscious of it, 
while it intelligently commands more labile spatial/motor processes in the Where stream that 
control our changing bodies. 
 
Homologous laminar cortical circuits for all biological intelligence: Beyond Bayes 
The second computational paradigm is called Laminar Computing (Grossberg, 1999, 2013b, 
2017b; Grossberg, Mingolla, and Ross, 1997). Laminar Computing describes how the 
cerebral cortex is organized into layered circuits whose specializations support all higher-
order biological intelligence. Indeed, the laminar circuits of cerebral cortex seem to realize a 
revolutionary computational synthesis of the best properties of feedforward and feedback 
processing, digital and analog processing, and data-driven bottom-up processing and 
hypothesis-driven top-down processing (Grossberg, 2007, 2013b). For example, in response 
to an unambiguous scene, a fast feedforward sweep can occur through the entire visual 
hierarchy, leading to rapid recognition, as reported by Thorpe, Fize, and Marlot (1996). Such  
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Figure 6.  (left panel) Vector Integration To Endpoint, or VITE, model circuit for reaching. 
A present position vector (P) is subtracted from a target position vector (T) to compute a 
difference vector (D) that represents the distance and direction in which the arm must move. 
The rectified difference vector ([D]) is multiplied by a volitional GO signal (G) before the 
velocity vector [D]G is integrated by P until P equals T, hence the model name Vector 
Integration to Endpoint. [Adapted with permission from Bullock and Grossberg (1988).] 
(right panel) DIRECT model circuit.  This refinement of VITE processing enables the brain 
to carry out what is called motor equivalent reaching, in particular to move a tool under 
visual guidance to its correct endpoint position on the first try, without measuring the 
dimensions of the tool or the angle that it makes with the hand. DIRECT hereby clarifies how 
a spatial affordance for tool use may have arisen from the ability of the brain to learn how do 
reach during infant development. In DIRECT, this developmental process uses an 
endogenous random generator, or ERG, to provide the “energy” during a critical period of 
motor babbling to activate a motor direction vector (DVm) that moves the hand/arm via the 
motor present position vector (PPVm). As the hand/arm moves, the eyes reactively track the 
position of the moving hand, giving rise to the visually-activated spatial target position vector 
(TPVs) and spatial present position vector (PPVs), which coincide during reactive tracking. 
These vectors are used to compute the spatial difference vector (DVs). It is this spatial 
transformation, along with the mapping from spatial directions into motor directions, that 
gives the model its motor equivalent reaching capabilities. To compute these transformations, 
the PPVs first activates the spatio-motor present position vector (PPVsm), which is then 
subtracted from the TPVs. As a result, the PPVs signal that reaches the TPVs is slightly 
delayed, thereby enabling the DVs computation to occur. The PPVsm stage is one of two 
stages in the model where spatial and motor representations are combined. The subscripts “s” 
and “m” denote spatial and motor, respectively. A transformation, called a circular reaction 
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(Piaget, 1945, 1951, 1952), is learned from spatial-to-motor and motor-to-spatial 
representations at the two adaptive pathways in the model, which are denoted by 
hemispherical synapses. In particular, the spatial direction vector (DVs) is adaptively mapped 
into the motor direction vector (DVm), thereby carrying out the transformation from visual 
Direction Into joint Rotation that gives the DIRECT model its name. [Reprinted with 
permission from Bullock, Grossberg, and Guenther (1993).] 
 
a feedforward sweep can occur, for example, in the LAMINART architecture (Grossberg and 
Raizada, 2000; Raizada and Grossberg, 2001) that is shown in Figure 7 by leaping from 
retina to the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), then through layers 6, 4, and 2/3 in cortical 
area V1 to layers 6, 4, and 2/3 in cortical area V2, and beyond.  
 If, however, a scene contains ambiguous information, for example in the form of 
multiple possible groupings of the same sets of features in a complex textured scene, then the 
network can automatically use its feedback loops to make the best decision in the face of this 
uncertainty. In particular, competition among these groupings can occur due to inhibitory 
interneurons in layers 4 and 2/3 (black cells and synapses in Figure 7). This competition can 
cause all cell activities to become smaller because the competitive circuits in the model are 
self-normalizing; that is, they tend to conserve the total activity of the circuit. This self-
normalizing property arises from the ability of the shunting on-center off-surround networks 
that realize the competitive circuits to process input contrasts over a large dynamic range 
without saturation, and thereby solve what I have called the noise-saturation dilemma 
(Grossberg, 1973, 1980).  
 Self-normalizing competition among alternative cortical interpretations of the data 
may hereby reduce the activation amplitude and coherence of each grouping alternative, 
thereby slowing down its processing. This slowing down of processing rate occurs as 
interlaminar, but intracortical, feedback between layers 2/3-to-6-to-4-to-2/3 (Figure 7), 
among other feedback pathways, contrast-enhances and amplifies the grouping that is 
supported by the most evidence.  The amplification of the winning grouping’s activity 
automatically speeds up its ability to send output signals to the next cortical region.  
 This example illustrates an important sense in which the cortex “runs as fast as it can” 
in response to the degree of uncertainty in the data, automatically switching from fast 
feedforward processing in response to unambiguous data to slower feedback processing to 
resolve uncertainties in the data to the degree that the data allow. Our brains hereby go 
beyond current Bayesian models to implement a kind of real-time probability theory and 
hypothesis testing that trades uncertainty against speed to make the best decisions in response 
to probabilistic environments whose rules can change rapidly through time. 
 Figure 7 also depicts how the ART Matching Rule circuit in Figure 4 is realized 
within the laminar circuits of neocortex. For example, the top-down pathway from layer 6 in 
V2 projects to layer 6 in V1, which sends bottom-up signals to layer 4. These bottom-up 
signals are sent via a modulatory on-center (note the balanced excitatory and inhibitory 
pathways to layer 4) surrounded by a driving off-surround network.  The top-down signals 
from V2 are hereby “folded” at layer 6 in V1 in order to reach layer 4. I have accordingly 
called this property folded feedback.  
 Because the ART Matching Rule is realized within laminar neocortical circuits, they 
can solve the stability-plasticity dilemma and support rapid learning and stable memory. 
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Figure 7. The LAMINART model clarifies how bottom-up, horizontal, and top-down 
interactions within and across cortical layers in V1 and V2 interblob and pale stripe regions, 
respectively, carry out bottom-up adaptive filtering, horizontal grouping, and top-down 
attention to carry out perceptual grouping, including boundary completion. Similar 
interactions seem to occur in all six-layered cortices. See text for details. [Reprinted with 
permission from Raizada and Grossberg (2001).] 
 
Figure 7 also shows that bottom-up signals from the LGN use the same modulatory on-center, 
off-surround network to activate layer 4 in V1 that is used by the top-down attentional 
feedback pathway. In addition, there is a direct bottom-up excitatory pathway from LGN to 
layer 4 so that the LGN can activate V1 in response to inputs from the retina.  Taken together, 
the direct LGN-to-4 pathway and the LGN-to-6-to-4 modulatory on-center, off-surround 
network ensure that bottom-up inputs from the LGN to V1 are contrast-normalized  at layer 4 
cells.  
 The sharing of the layer 6-to-4 modulatory on-center, off-surround network by 
bottom-up and top-down pathways converts this network into a decision interface where pre-
attentive automatic bottom-up processing and attentive task-selective top-down processing 
can cooperate and compete to choose the combination of signals that is most salient at any 
given moment.  
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 Such a cooperative-competitive decision interface exists in every granular neocortical 
area. As a result, a top-down task-selective priming signal from a higher cortical area can 
propagate through multiple lower cortical areas via their layers 6, which can then activate 
their layer 6-to-4 modulatory on-center, off-surround networks. In this way, an entire cortical 
hierarchy may get ready to process incoming bottom-up signals to accommodate the bias 
imposed by the prime. 
 Figure 7 also shows that layer 2/3 in each cortical area also projects back to layer 6, 
and then up to layer 4 via the folded feedback network. The horizontal connections in layer 
2/3 carry out a variety of functions in different cortical areas. In V2, they carry out perceptual 
grouping and boundary completion (von der Heydt, Peterhans, and Baumgartner, 1984), a 
process whose so-called bipole grouping properties were predicted before the 
neurophysiological data of von der Heydt et al. were reported (Cohen and Grossberg, 1984; 
Grossberg, 1984) and which were subsequently extensively modeled by LAMINART (e.g., 
Grossberg and Raizada, 2000; Grossberg and Yazdanbakhsh, 2005; Leveille, Versace, and 
Grossberg, 2010; Raizada and Grossberg, 2001). In cognitive processing regions, such as the 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, it has been suggested that such horizontal connections enable 
learning of categories, also called list chunks, that respond selectively to sequences of items 
that are stored in working memory (Grossberg and Pearson, 2008; Kazerounian and 
Grossberg, 2014). 
 The development of these horizontal connections begins before birth and continues in 
response to the statistics of visual environments after birth. The fact that the layer 2/3-to-6-
to-4-to-2/3 pathway satisfies the ART Matching Rule enables this development, as well as 
that of other cortical circuits, to dynamically self-stabilize even before higher cortical areas 
are developed enough to send reliable top-down intercortical attentional signals with which 
to further stabilize it. Thus “cells that fire together can wire together” without risking 
catastrophic forgetting in these laminar cortical circuits. I like to describe this property by 
saying that “the preattentive perceptual grouping is its own attentional prime” (Grossberg, 
1999).  
 The above combination of properties illustrates how parsimoniously and elegantly 
laminar cortical circuits carry out their multi-faceted functions. 
            
The same canonical laminar design models vision, speech, and cognition: VLSI! Even 
elegant model designs must also support intelligent behavioral functions in order to provide 
compelling explanations of how brains work, and a guide for new technological 
developments. In fact, variations of the LAMINART cortical design have, to the present, 
been naturally embodied in laminar cortical models of vision, speech, and cognition that 
explain and predict psychological and neurobiological data that other models have not yet 
handled. These models include the 3D LAMINART model of 3D vision and figure-ground 
separation (e.g., Cao and Grossberg, 2005, 2012; Fang and Grossberg, 2009; Grossberg and 
Howe, 2003; Grossberg and Swaminathan, 2004; Grossberg and Yazdanbakhsh, 2005; 
Grossberg et al., 2008; Leveille, Versace, and Grossberg, 2010), the cARTWORD model of 
conscious speech perception (Grossberg and Kazerounian, 2011; Kazerounian and Grossberg, 
2014), and the LIST PARSE model of cognitive working memory and chunking (Grossberg 
and Pearson, 2008; Silver et al., 2011).  
 These models illustrate how all neocortical areas combine bottom-up, horizontal, and 
top-down interactions that embody variations of the same canonical laminar cortical circuitry 
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that is illustrated by Figure 7. These specialized laminar architectures hereby provide a 
blueprint for a general-purpose VLSI chip set whose specializations may be used to embody 
different kinds of biological intelligence as part of an autonomous adaptive agent. From the 
perspective of ART as a biological theory, they also illustrate how different resonances may 
use similar circuits to support different conscious experiences, as I will note in greater detail 
below. 
 
Why a unified theory is possible: Equations, modules, and architectures 
There are several fundamental mathematical reasons why it is possible for human scientists 
to discover a unified mind-brain theory that links brain mechanisms and psychological 
functions, and to demonstrate how similar organizational principles and mechanisms, 
suitably specialized, can support conscious qualia across modalities.  
One reason for such inter-modality unity is that a small number of equations suffices 
to model all modalities. These include equations for short-term memory, or STM; medium-
term memory, or MTM; and long-term memory, or LTM, that I published in The 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in 1968. See Grossberg (2013a, 2013b) for 
recent reviews of these equations.  
These equations are used to define a somewhat larger number of modules, or 
microcircuits, that are also used in multiple modalities where they can carry out different 
functions within each modality. These modules include shunting on-center off-surround 
networks, gated dipole opponent processing networks, associative learning networks, spectral 
adaptively-timed learning networks, and the like. Each of these types of modules exhibits a 
rich, but not universal, set of useful computational properties. For example, shunting on-
center off-surround networks can carry out properties like contrast-normalization, including 
discounting the illuminant; contrast-enhancement, noise suppression, and winner-take-all 
choice; short-term memory and working memory storage; attentive matching of bottom-up 
input patterns and top-down learned expectations; and synchronous oscillations and traveling 
waves.  
Finally, these equations and modules are specialized and assembled into modal 
architectures, where “modal” stands for different modalities of biological intelligence, 
including architectures for vision, audition, cognition, cognitive-emotional interactions, and 
sensory-motor control.  
An integrated self or agent, with autonomous adaptive capabilities, is possible 
because it builds on a shared set of equations and modules within modal architectures that 
can interact seamlessly together.  
Modal architectures are general-purpose, in the sense that they can process any kind 
of inputs to that modality, whether from the external world or from other modal architectures. 
They are also self-organizing, in the sense that they can autonomously develop and learn in 
response to these inputs. Modal architectures are thus less general than the von Neumann 
architecture that provides the mathematical foundation of modern computers, but much more 
general than a traditional AI algorithm. ART networks form part of several different modal 
architectures, including modal architectures that enable seeing, hearing, feeling, and knowing. 
 
All conscious states are resonant states 
ART resonances clarify questions such as the following, which have been raised by 
distinguished philosophers (Grossberg, 2017b): What kind of "event" occurs in the brain 
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during a conscious experience that is anything more than just a "whir of information-
processing"?  What happens when conscious mental states "light up" and directly appear to 
the subject? ART explains that, over and above "just" information processing, our brains 
sometimes go into a context-sensitive resonant state that can involve multiple brain regions. 
Abundant experimental evidence support the ART prediction that "all conscious states are 
resonant states". Not all brain dynamics are "resonant", and thus consciousness is not just a 
"whir of information-processing".  
Second, when does a resonant state embody a conscious experience? And how do 
different resonant states support different kinds of conscious qualia? The other side of the 
coin is equally important: When does a resonant state fail to embody a conscious experience? 
ART explains (Grossberg, 2017b) how various evolutionary challenges that advanced brains 
face in order to adapt to changing environments in real time have been met with particular 
conscious states, which form part of larger adaptive behavioral capabilities. ART sheds new 
mechanistic light on the fact that humans are not conscious just to Platonically contemplate 
the beauty of the world. Rather, humans are conscious in order to enable them to better adapt 
to the world's changing demands. To illustrate these claims, ART explains how resonances 
for conscious seeing help to ensure effective looking and reaching, resonances for conscious 
hearing help to ensure effective speaking, and resonances for conscious feeling help to ensure 
effective goal-directed action.  
 
The varieties of brain resonances and the conscious experiences that they support 
Towards this end, ART has explained six different types of neural representations of 
conscious qualia, and has provided enough theoretical background and data explanations 
based on these representations to illustrate their explanatory and predictive power (Grossberg, 
2017b). These explanations also suggest multiple kinds of experiments to deepen our 
mechanistic understanding of the brain mechanisms for generating conscious resonances.  
For example, surface-shroud resonances are predicted to support conscious percepts 
of visual qualia. Feature-category resonances are predicted to support conscious recognition 
of visual objects and scenes. Both kinds of resonances may synchronize during conscious 
seeing and recognition, so that we know what a familiar object is when we consciously see it. 
Stream-shroud resonances are predicted to support conscious percepts of auditory qualia. 
Spectral-pitch-and-timbre resonances are predicted to support conscious recognition of 
sources in auditory streams. Stream-shroud and spectral-pitch-and-timbre resonances may 
synchronize during conscious hearing and recognition of auditory streams, so that we know 
what the familiar sounds are that are segregated in a stream. Item-list resonances are 
predicted to support recognition of speech and language. They may synchronize with stream-
shroud and spectral-pitch-and-timbre resonances during conscious hearing of speech and 
language, and build upon the selection of auditory sources by spectral-pitch-and-timbre 
resonances in order to recognize the acoustical signals that are grouped together within these 
streams. Cognitive-emotional resonances are predicted to support conscious percepts of 
feelings, as well as recognition of the source of these feelings. Cognitive-emotional 
resonances can also synchronize with resonances that support conscious qualia and 
knowledge about them. All of these resonances have distinct anatomical substrates that are 
explained in Grossberg (2017b), which also explains various psychological and 
neurobiological data from typical and clinical individuals.  
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Figure 8.  Complementary computational properties of visual boundaries and surfaces. 
Visual boundaries and surfaces are computed by the interblob and blob cortical processing 
streams, respectively, that occur within and between cortical areas V1, V2, and V4, An 
illusory square is completed in response to the configuration of black and blue arcs that form 
the image. When this happens, breaks, called end gaps, occur in the boundaries where the 
black arcs touch the blue arcs. Blue color can then flow out of the blue arcs to fill-in the 
interior of the illusory square. The resulting percept of neon color spreading illustrates 
complementary properties of boundary completion and surface filling-in (Grossberg, 1984; 
Grossberg and Mingolla, 1985), namely: Boundaries are completed in an oriented way, 
inward between pairs or greater numbers of inducers with similar orientational preferences, 
and are insensitive to contrast polarity, in the sense that they pool over opposite contrast 
polarities using V1 complex cells at each position. In contrast, surfaces fill-in brightness and 
surface color in an unoriented way, outward from individual contrastive inducers, and are 
sensitive to contrast polarity, indeed support the visible qualia that observers can consciously 
see. These three pairs of boundary and surface properties (oriented vs. unoriented, inward vs. 
outward, insensitive vs. sensitive to contrast polarity) are manifestly complementary. 
Properties that are needed to complete a boundary cannot be used to fill-in a surface, and 
conversely. On the other hand, boundaries and surfaces need to reciprocally interact across 
the interblob and blob stream for either of them to generate a useful percept. 
 
Why does resonance trigger consciousness?  
Detailed analyses of psychological and neurobiological data by ART clarify why resonance 
is necessary for consciousness. As one example: In order to fully compute visual boundaries 
and surfaces whereby to see the world, the brain computes three pairs of complementary 
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computational properties of boundaries and surfaces (Figure 8), along with three hierarchical 
resolutions of uncertainty that require multiple processing stages to overcome. This example 
illustrates that there is a great deal of uncertainty in the early stages of visual processing by 
the brain. Only after all three hierarchical resolutions of uncertainty are complete, and after 
boundaries are completed and surfaces filled-in, has the brain constructed a contextually 
informative and temporally stable enough representation of scenic objects on which to base 
adaptive behaviors.  
     If this is indeed the case, then why do not the earlier stages undermine behavior? The 
proposed answer is that brain resonance, and with it conscious awareness, is triggered at the 
processing stage that represents visual boundary and surface representations, after they are 
complete and stable enough to control visually-based behaviors like attentive looking and 
reaching. ART also explains how, after such a resonance is triggered between prestriate 
visual cortex and parietal cortex, it can propagate bottom-up to higher cortical areas, such as 
prefrontal cortex, and top-down to earlier cortical and LGN processing areas, using the ART 
Matching Rule (Figure 4) to select data that consistent with the triggering resonance and to 
suppress inconsistent information.  
 
Towards autonomous adaptive intelligent agents and clinical therapies in society 
The above summary suggests that a firm foundation has been build over the past 50 years 
whereby discoveries about mind and brain can greatly influence the development of 
technologies that can have a profound impact on society, and can facilitate a deeper 
mechanistic understanding of several major mental disorders. The technological 
developments will include increasingly autonomous adaptive agents, whereas new clinical 
therapies for mental disorders will benefit from understanding the neural mechanisms can 
cause their behavioral symptoms.  
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